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Abstract
Wyner’s work on wiretap channels and the recent works on information theoretic security are based on random
codes. Achieving information theoretical security with practical coding schemes is of definite interest. In this note,
the attempt is to overcome this elusive task by employing the polar coding technique of Arikan. It is shown that
polar codes achieve non-trivial perfect secrecy rates for binary-input degraded wiretap channels while enjoying their
low encoding-decoding complexity. In the special case of symmetric main and eavesdropper channels, this coding
technique achieves the secrecy capacity. Extension of the coding technique to the multiple-access channels with a
degraded eavesdropper is discussed. Finally, fading erasure wiretap channels are considered and a secret key agreement
scheme is proposed, which requires only the statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper channel state information (CSI).
The enabling factor is the creation of advantage over Eve, by blindly using the proposed scheme over each fading
block, which is then exploited with privacy amplification techniques to generate secret keys.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy was introduced by Shannon to study secure communication over
point-to-point noiseless channels [1]. This line of work was later extended by Wyner [2] to noisy channels. Wyner’s
degraded wiretap channel assumes that the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the one seen by the
legitimate receiver. Under this assumption, Wyner showed that the advantage of the main channel over that of the
eavesdropper, in terms the lower noise level, can be exploited to transmit secret bits using random codes. This
keyless secrecy result was then extended to a more general (broadcast) model in [3] and to the Gaussian setting
in [4]. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in wireless physical layer security (see, e.g., Special Issue on
Information Theoretic Security, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, June 2008 and references therein). However, designing
practical codes to achieve secrecy for any given main and eavesdropper channels remained as an elusive task.
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2In [5], the authors constructed LDPC based wiretap codes for certain binary erasure channel (BEC) and binary
symmetric channel (BSC) scenarios. In particular, when the main channel is noiseless and the eavesdropper channel
is a BEC, [5] presented codes that approach secrecy capacity. For other scenarios, secrecy capacity achieving code
design is stated as an open problem. Similarly, [6] considers the design of secure nested codes for the noiseless
main channel setting (see also [7]).
This work considers secret communication over a binary-input degraded wiretap channel. Using the polar coding
technique of Arikan [8], we show that non-trivial secrecy rates are achievable. According to our best knowledge,
this coding technique is the first provable and practical (having low encoding and decoding complexity) secrecy
encoding technique for this set of channels. In the special case of the symmetric main and eavesdropper channels,
this technique achieves the secrecy capacity of the channel 1. The results are also extended to the multiple-access
setting, where the coding scheme is shown to achieve non-trivial secrecy rates for both users. Finally, we consider
fading wiretap channels and propose a key agreement scheme where the users only assumed to have the statistical
knowledge of the eavesdropper CSI. The enabling observation is that by blindly using the scheme over many fading
blocks, the users will eventually create an advantage over Eve, which can then be exploited to generate secret keys
using privacy amplification techniques.
II. NOTATIONS
Throughout this paper, vectors are denoted by xN1 = {x1, · · · , xN} or by x¯ if we omit the indices. Random
variables are denoted with capital letters X , which are defined over sets denoted by the calligraphic letters X . For
a given set A ⊂ {1, · · · , N}, we write xA to denote the sub-vector {xi : i ∈ A}. Omitting the random variables,
we use the following shorthand for probability distributions p(x) , Pr(X = x), p(x|y) , Pr(X = x|Y = y).
III. POLAR CODES
Consider a binary-input DMC (B-DMC) given by W (y|x), where x ∈ X = {0, 1} and y ∈ Y for some finite set
Y . The N uses of W is denoted by WN (yN1 |xN1 ). The symmetric capacity of a B-DMC W is given by
I(W ) ,
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
1
2
W (y|x) log2
 W (y|x)∑
x′∈X
1
2W (y|x′)
 , (1)
which is the mutual information I(X;Y ) when the input X is uniformly distributed. The Bhattacharyya parameter
of W is given by
Z(W ) ,
∑
y∈Y
√
W (y|0)W (y|1), (2)
which measures the reliability of W as it is an upper bound on the probability of ML decision error on a single
use of the channel.
1We acknowledge that the concurrent work [9] independently established the result that polar codes can achieve the secrecy capacity of the
degraded wiretap channels, when both main and eavesdropper channels are binary-input and symmetric (Corollary 7 of this note).
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3Polar codes is recently introduced by Arikan [8]. These codes can be encoded and decoded with complexity
O(N log(N)), while achieving an overall block-error probability that is bounded as O(2−N
β
) for any fixed β < 12
([8], [10]). In [8], channel polarization is used to construct codes (polar codes) that can achieve the symmetric
capacity, I(W ), of any given B-DMC W . Channel polarization consists of two operations: Channel combining and
channel splitting. Let uN1 be the vector to be transmitted. The combined channel is represented by WN and is given
by
WN (yN1 |uN1 ) =WN (yN1 |uN1 BNF⊗n), (3)
where BN is a bit-reversal permutation matrix, N = 2n, and F ,
 1 0
1 1
. Note that the actual channel input
here is given by xN1 = u
N
1 BNF
⊗n. The channel splitting constructs N binary input channels from WN , where the
transformation is given by
W
(i)
N (y
N
1 , u
i−1
1 |ui) ,
∑
uNi+1∈XN−i
1
2N−1
WN (yN1 |uN1 ). (4)
The polarization phenomenon is shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 of [8]): For any B-DMC W , N = 2n for some n, and δ ∈ (0, 1),
lim
N→∞
|{i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : I(W (i)N ) ∈ (1− δ, 1]}|
N
= I(W ),
and
lim
N→∞
|{i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : I(W (i)N ) ∈ [0, δ)}|
N
= 1− I(W ).
In order to derive the rate of the channel polarization, the random process Zn is defined in [8] and in [10].
Basically,
Pr{Zn ∈ (a, b)} = |{i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(W
(i)
2n ) ∈ (a, b)}|
N
(5)
The rate of the channel polarization is given by the following.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1 of [10]): For any B-DMC W and for any given β < 12 ,
lim
n→∞ Pr{Zn < 2
−2nβ} = I(W ).
Now, the idea of polar coding is clear. The encoder-decoder pair, utilizing the polarization effect, will transmit
data through the subchannels for which Z(W (i)N ) is near 0. In [8], the polar code (N,K,A, uAc) for B-DMC W
is defined by xN1 = u
N
1 BNF
⊗n, where uAc is a given frozen vector, and the information set A is chosen such that
|A| = K and Z(W (i)N ) < Z(W (j)N ) for all i ∈ A, j ∈ Ac. The frozen vector uAc is given to the decoder. Arikan’s
successive cancellation (SC) estimates the input as follows: For the frozen indices uˆAc = uAc . For the remaining
indices s.t. i ∈ A; uˆi = 0, if W (i)N (yN1 , uˆi−11 |0) ≥ W (i)N (yN1 , uˆi−11 |1) and uˆi = 1, otherwise. With this decoder, it
is shown in [8] that the average block error probability over the ensemble (consisting of all possible frozen vector
choices) of polar codes is bounded by
Pe(N) ≤
∑
i∈A
Z(W (i)N ).
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4We now state the main result of [8] using the bound given in [10].
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2 of [10]): For any given B-DMC W with I(W ) > 0, let R < I(W ) and β ∈ (0, 12 ) be
fixed. Block error probability for polar coding under SC decoding (averaged over possible choices of frozen vectors)
satisfies
Pe(N) = O(2−N
β
).
Sketch of the proof: For any given β ∈ (0, 12 ) and ² > 0, we can define the sequence of polar codes by
choosing the information indices as
AN = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(W (i)N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β}.
Then, from the above theorems, for sufficiently large N , we can achieve the rate
R =
|AN |
N
≥ I(W )− ²
with average block error probability (averaged over the possible choices of uAcN )
Pe(N) ≤
∑
i∈AN
Z(W (i)N ) ≤ 2−N
β
under SC decoding. (See also [11].)
This result shows the existence of a polar code (N,K,A, uAc) achieving the symmetric capacity of W . We
remark that, any frozen vector choice of uAc will work for symmetric channels [8]. For our purposes, we will
denote a polar code for B-DMC W with C(N,F , uF ), where the frozen set is given by F , Ac. Note that, A
denotes the indices of information transmission for the polar code, whereas F is the set of frozen indices.
A. Polarization for degraded channels
In [11], the following lemma is proven
Lemma 4 (Lemma 4.7 of [11]): Let W : X → Y and W ′ : X → Y ′ be two B-DMCs such that W is degraded
w.r.t. W ′, i.e., there exists a channel W ′′ : Y ′ → Y such that
W (y|x) =
∑
y′∈Y′
W ′(y′|x)W ′′(y|y′).
Then, W (i)N is degraded w.r.t. W
′(i)
N and Z(W
(i)
N ) ≥ Z(W ′(i)N ).
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION OVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
A discrete memoryless wiretap channel with is denoted by
(X ,W (ym, ye|x),Ym × Ye),
for some finite sets X ,Ym,Ye. Here the symbols x ∈ X are the channel inputs and the symbols (ym, ye) ∈
Ym ×Ye are the channel outputs observed at the main decoder and at the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel
is memoryless and time-invariant:
p(ymi, yei|xi1, ymi−11 , yei−11 ) =W (ymi, yei|xi).
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5We assume that the transmitter has a secret message M which is to be transmitted to the receiver in N channel
uses and to be secured from the eavesdropper. In this setting, a secret codebook has the following components:
1) The secret message set M. The transmitted messages are assumed to be uniformly distributed over these
message sets.
2) A stochastic encoding function f(.) at the transmitter which maps the secret messages to the transmitted
symbols: f : m→ XN1 for each m ∈M.
3) Decoding function φ(.) at receiver which maps the received symbols to estimate of the message: φ(YmN1 ) =
{mˆ}.
The reliability of transmission is measured by the following probability of error.
Pe =
1
|M|
∑
(m)∈M
Pr
{
φ(YmN1 ) 6= (m)|(m) is sent
}
The secrecy is measured by the mutual information leakage rate to the eavesdropper
1
N
I
(
M ;YeN1
)
.
We say that the rate R is an achievable secrecy rate, if, for any given ² > 0, there exists a secret codebook such
that,
1
N
log(|M|) = R
Pe ≤ ²
1
N
I
(
M ;YeN1
) ≤ ² (6)
for sufficiently large N .
Consider a degraded binary-input wiretap channel, where, for the input set X = {0, 1}, the main channel is given
by
Wm(ym|x) (7)
and the symmetric eavesdropper channel is
We(ye|x) =
∑
ym∈Ym
Wm(ym|x)Wd(ye|ym). (8)
Here, the degradation is due to the channel Wd(ye|ym).
Note that, due to degradation, polar codes designed for the eavesdropper channel can be used for the main
channel. For a given sufficiently large N and β ∈ (0, 12 ), let
Am = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(Wm(i)N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β},
and
Ae = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(We(i)N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β}.
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6Now, consider a polar code Cm , C(N,Fm, uFm) for the main channel with some uFm . Due to Lemma 4, we have
Ae ⊂ Am and hence Fm ⊂ Fe. Now, for any given length |Fe| − |Fm| vector v¯m and uFm , we define the vector
uFe(v¯m) with uFm(v¯m) = uFm and uFe\Fm(v¯m) = v¯m. Then, the code Ce(v¯m) , C(N,Fe, uFe(v¯m)) will be a
symmetric capacity achieving polar code for the eavesdropper channel We for any v¯m if the eavesdropper channel
is symmetric (as any frozen vector choice for symmetric channels will work [8]). This implies that the code for
the main channel can be partitioned as Cm = ∪v¯mCe(v¯m). This observation, when considered over the ensemble
of codes, enables us to construct secrecy achieving polar coding schemes, even if the eavesdropper channel is not
symmetric, as characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: For a binary-input degraded wiretap channel, the perfect secrecy rate, I(Wm)− I(We), is achieved
by polar coding.
Proof:
Encoding: We map the secret message to be transmitted to v¯m and generate a random vector v¯r, according to
uniform distribution over X , of length |Ae|. Then, the channel input is constructed with xN1 = uN1 BNF⊗n, where
is the frozen vector of the polar code Cm, uFe\Fm = v¯m, and uAe = v¯r. The polar code ensemble is constructed
over all different choices of frozen vectors, i.e., uFm .
Decoding: The vectors v¯m and v¯r can be decoded with the SC decoder described above with error probability
Pe = O(2−N
β
) (averaged over the ensemble) achieving a rate R = |v¯m|N = I(Wm)− I(We) for sufficiently large
N .
Security: Lets assume that the vector v¯m is given to the eavesdropper along with uFm . Then, employing the SC
decoding, the eavesdropper can decode the random vector v¯r with Pe = O(2−N
β
) averaged over the ensemble.
Utilizing the Fano’s inequality and average it over the code ensemble seen by the Eve, i.e. over V¯m and UFm , we
obtain
H(V¯r|V¯m, UFm , YeN1 ) ≤ H(Pe) +N log(|X |)Pe ≤ N²(N), (9)
where ²(N)→ 0 as N →∞.
Then, the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper averaged over the ensemble can be bounded as follows.
I(M ;YeN1 |UFm) = I(V¯m;YeN1 |UFm) (10)
= I(V¯m, V¯r;YeN1 |UFm)− I(V¯r;YeN1 |V¯m, UFm) (11)
(a)
= I(UN1 ;Ye
N
1 )−H(V¯r) +H(V¯r|V¯m, UFm , YeN1 ) (12)
(b)
≤ I(XN1 ;YeN1 )−H(V¯r) +H(V¯r|V¯m, UFm , YeN1 ) (13)
(c)
≤ NI(We)− |Ae|+H(V¯r|V¯m, uFm , YeN1 ) (14)
(d)
≤ NI(We)− |Ae|+N²(N), (15)
where in (a) we have UN1 each entry with i.i.d. uniformly distributed, (b) follows from data processing inequality,
(c) is due to I(XN1 ;Ye
N
1 ) =
N∑
i=1
I(XN1 ;Yei|Yei−11 ) ≤
N∑
i=1
H(Yei) − H(Yei|Xi) = NI(Xi;Yei) with a uniformly
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7distributed Xi, and (d) follows from (9) with ²(N)→ 0 as N →∞. As |Ae|N → I(We) as N gets large, we obtain
1
N
I(V¯m;YeN1 |UFm) ≤ ² (16)
for a given ² > 0 for sufficiently large N . As the reliability and secrecy constraints are satisfied averaged over the
ensemble, there exist a polar code with some fixed uFm achieving the secure rate I(Wm)− I(We).
Note that in the above result, the code satisfying the reliability and the secrecy constraints can be found from the
ensemble by an exhaustive search. However, as block length increases, almost all the codes in the ensemble will do
equally well. If the eavesdropper channel is symmetric, then the secrecy constraint is satisfied for any given frozen
vector uFm and the code search is only for the reliability constraint. If the eavesdropper channel is not symmetric,
a prefix channel can be utilized to have this property.
Corollary 6: For non-symmetric eavesdropper channels, the channel can be prefixed with some p(x|x′) such that
the resulting eavesdropper channel
W ′e(ye|x′) =
∑
ym∈Ym
p(x|x′)Wm(ym|x)Wd(ye|ym)
is symmetric. Then, using the scheme above, the secret rate
R = I(W ′m)− I(W ′e)
is achievable, where W ′m(ym|x′) = p(x|x′)Wm(ym|x).
Finally, we note that the scheme achieves the secrecy capacity and any code in the ensemble, i.e., any fixed uFm ,
will satisfy both the reliability and secrecy constraints, if the main and eavesdropper channels are symmetric.
Corollary 7: For a binary-input degraded wiretap channel with symmetric main and eavesdropper channels, polar
coding achieves the secrecy capacity, i.e., C(Wm)− C(We), of the channel.
V. SECURE TRANSMISSION OVER MULTIPLE-ACCESS CHANNEL
A discrete memoryless two-user multiple access channel with an eavesdropper (MAC-E) is denoted by
(X1 ×X2,W (ym, ye|x1, x2),Ym × Ye),
for some finite sets X1,X2,Ym,Ye. Here the symbols (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2 are the channel inputs and the symbols
(ym, ye) ∈ Ym × Ye are the channel outputs observed at the main decoder and at the eavesdropper, respectively.
The channel is memoryless and time-invariant:
p(ymi, yei|x1i1, x2i1, ymi−11 , yei−11 ) =W (ymi, yei|x1i, x2i).
We assume that each transmitter k ∈ {1, 2} has a secret message Mk which is to be transmitted to the receiver
in N channel uses and to be secured from the eavesdropper. In this setting, secret codebooks have the following
components:
1) The secret message set Mk; k = 1, 2. The transmitted messages are assumed to be uniformly distributed over
these message sets.
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82) A stochastic encoding function fk(.) at transmitter k which maps the secret messages to the transmitted
symbols: fk : mk → XkN1 for each mk ∈Mk; k = 1, 2.
3) Decoding function φ(.) at receiver which maps the received symbols to estimates of the messages: φ(YmN1 ) =
{mˆ1, mˆ2}.
The reliability of transmission is measured by the following probability of error.
Pe =
1
|M1||M2|
∑
(m1,m2)∈M1×M2
Pr
{
φ(YmN1 ) 6= {m1,m2}|(m1,m2) is sent
}
The secrecy is measured by the mutual information leakage rate to the eavesdropper
1
N
I
(
M1,M2;YeN1
)
.
We say that the rate tuple (R1, R2) is achievable for the channel, if, for any given ² > 0, there exists a secret
codebook such that,
1
N
log(|M1|) = R1
1
N
log(|M2|) = R2,
Pe ≤ ²,
and
1
N
I
(
M1,M2;YeN1
) ≤ ² (17)
for sufficiently large N .
Finally, we note that the secrecy requirement imposed on the full message set implies the secrecy of individual
messages. In other words, 1nI(M1,M2;Ye
N
1 ) ≤ ² implies 1nI(Mk;YeN1 ) ≤ ² for k = 1, 2.
We focus on a binary-input degraded MAC-E, where the main channel is given by
Wm(ym|x1, x2) (18)
and the eavesdropper channel is
We(ye|x1, x2) =
∑
ym∈Ym
Wm(ym|x1, x2)Wd(ye|ym). (19)
Here, the degradation is due to the channel Wd(ye|ym). Utilizing the scheme given in the previous section together
with a successive cancelation scheme for decoding messages, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 8: For a binary-input degraded MAC-E, we define
W1m(ym|x1) ,
∑
x2
p(x2)Wm(ym|x1, x2)
W1e(ye|x1) ,
∑
x2,ym
p(x2)Wm(ym|x1, x2)Wd(ye|ym)
W2m(ym, x1|x2) , p(x1)Wm(ym|x1, x2)
W2e(ye, x1|x2) ,
∑
ym
p(x1)Wm(ym|x1, x2)Wd(ye|ym)
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9for uniform input distributions p(x1) and p(x2). Then, the secret rate pair
R1 = I(W1m)− I(W1e) (20)
R2 = I(W2m)− I(W2e) (21)
is achieved by polar coding.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Note that another rate pair that is obtained by reversing the indices above is achievable. The overall region can
be stated as the time sharing of the two rate pairs. Here, as noted in the previous section, the secrecy constraint is
satisfied w.h.p. for any code pair in the ensembles of users as block length gets large (if an exhaustive search over the
ensembles is not possible). But, if the channels W1e and W2e defined in the theorem are symmetric, and sum of the
capacity of these channels is equal to the sum capacity of Eve, i.e.,
{
max
p(x1)p(x2)
I(X1, X2;Ye)
}
= I(W1e)+I(W2e),
then (using this at step (a) of (55)) we can show that any code pair in the ensembles satisfy the reliability and
secrecy constraints.
VI. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER FADING WIRETAP CHANNELS
In this section, we focus on the following key agreement problem: Alice, over fading wiretap channel, would
like to agree on a secret key with Bob in the presence of passive eavesdropper Eve. For simplicity, we focus on
the special case of binary erasure main and eavesdropper channels, and the results can be extended to arbitrary
binary-input channels using the result of Section IV.
Fading blocks are represented by i = 1, · · · ,ML and each block has N channel uses. Random variables
over blocks are represented with the following bar notation. Y¯ (l;m)e denotes the observations of Eve over the
fading block m of the super block l, the observations of Eve over super block l ∈ [1, L] is denoted by Y¯ (l)e =
Y¯
(l;1···M)
e , {Y¯ (l;1)e · · · Y¯ (l;M)e }, and Eve’s total observation over all super blocks is denoted by Y ∗e = Y¯ (1···L)e =
{Y¯ (1)e , · · · , Y¯ (L)e }.
Main and eavesdropper channels are binary erasure channels and are denoted by W (i)m and W
(i)
e , respectively.
Here, the channels Wm and We are random, outcome of which result in the channels of each block. Instantaneous
eavesdropper CSI is not known at the users, only the statistical knowledge of it is assumed. The channels are
assumed to be physically degraded w.r.t. some order at each block 2. Note that, in this setup, eavesdropper channel
can be better than the main channel on the average.
We utilize the proposed secrecy encoding scheme for the wiretap channel at each fading block. Omitting the
block indices, frozen and information bits are denoted as uFM and uAM , respectively. Information bits are uniformly
distributed binary random variables and are mapped to uAM . Secret and randomization bits among these information
bits are denoted by V¯m and V¯r, respectively. Frozen bits are provided both to main receiver and eavesdropper at
2Remarkable, a random walk model with packet erasures can be covered with this model. Also, parallel channel model is equivalent to this
scenario.
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each block. (We omitted writing this side information below as all zero vector can be chosen as the frozen vector
for the erasure channel [8].) Note that Alice and Bob do not know the length of V¯ (i)m at fading block i. In particular,
there may not be any secured bits at a given fading block.
At this point, if the eavesdropper is degraded, we have
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m ) = C(W
(i)
m )− C(W (i)e ) (22)
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r ) = C(W
(i)
e ) (23)
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r |Y¯ (i)e , V¯ (i)m ) ≤ ², (24)
where the last inequality follows from Fano’s inequality, if V¯ (i)m is given to Eve by an oracle, for sufficiently large
N . Otherwise, if the main receiver is degraded, we have
H(V¯ (i)m ) = 0 (25)
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r ) = C(W
(i)
m ) (26)
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r |Y¯ (i)e ) ≤ ², (27)
for sufficiently large N .
Considering the resulting information accumulation over a block, we obtain the followings.
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m ) = [C(W
(i)
m )− C(W (i)e )]+, (28)
and
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r ) = min{C(W (i)m ), C(W (i)e )}, (29)
where the former denotes the amount of secure information generated at block i (here the secrecy level is the
bound on the mutual information leakage rate), and the latter denotes the remaining information. Note that these
entropies are random variables as channels are random over the blocks. Remarkable, this scheme converts the
fading phenomenon to the advantage of Alice and Bob (similar to the enabling observation utilized in [12]).
Exploiting this observation and coding over LM fading blocks, the proposed scheme below creates advantage
for the main users: As L,M,N get large, information bits, denoted by W ∗, are w.h.p. reliably decoded at the
Bob, H(W ∗) → LMN E [C(Wm)], and H(W ∗|Y ∗e ) → LMN E [[C(Wm)− C(We)]+]. This accomplishes both
advantage distillation and information reconciliation phases of a key agreement protocol [13]. Now, a third phase
(called as privacy amplification) is needed to distill a shorter string K from W ∗, about which Eve has only a
negligible amount of information. The privacy amplification step can be done with universal hashing as considered
in [13]. We first state the following definitions and lemma regarding universal hashing, and then formalize the main
result of this section in the following theorem.
Definition 9: A class G of functions A → B is universal if, for any x1 6= x2 in A, the probability that g(x1) =
g(x2) is at most 1|B| when g is chosen as random from G according to the uniform distribution.
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There are efficient universal classes, e.g., to map n bits to r bits, class of linear functions given by r×n matrices
needs rn bits to describe [14]. Note that hash function should have complexity as 1) it will be revealed to each
user, and 2) Alice and Bob will compute g(W ∗). There are more efficient classes with polynomial time evaluation
complexity and O(n) description complexity [14].
Generalized privacy amplification, proposed in [13], is based on the following property of universal hashing.
Lemma 10 (Theorem 3, [13]): Let X ∈ X be a random variable with distribution PX and Re´nyi entropy R(X) =
− log2E[PX(X)]. Let G be a random choice (according to uniform distribution) of a member of universal class
of hash functions X → {0, 1}r, and let Q = G(X). Then
H(Q|G) ≥ R(Q|G) ≥ r − log2
(
1 + 2r−R(X)
)
≥ r − 2
r−R(X)
ln 2
Exploiting the proposed coding scheme, which creates advantage in favor of Bob over multiple fading realizations
of the channel, we use the universal hashing described above and obtain the following result.
Theorem 11: For any ², ²∗ > 0, let
n = LM N (E [C(Wm)]− ²∗) ,
and
r = LM N
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]+
]− ²∗) .
Then, for sufficiently large L, M and N , Alice and Bob can w.h.p. agree on the random variable W ∗ , W¯ (1···L)
of length n over LM fading blocks (i.e., Pr{W ∗ 6= Wˆ ∗} ≤ ², where Wˆ ∗ denotes the estimate at Bob); and choose
K = G(W ∗) as their secret key, where G is chosen uniformly random from universal class of hash functions
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}r, satisfying
I(K;Y ∗e , G) ≤ ²,
where Y ∗e , Y¯
(1···L)
e denotes the Eve’s total received symbols.
Proof:
We repeat the described scheme over LM fading blocks. Due to the construction above, we have
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m )− ²1 ≤
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m |Y¯ (i)e ) ≤
1
N
H(V¯ (i)m ), (30)
where 1NH(V¯
(i)
m ) = [C(W
(i)
m ) − C(W (i)e )]+ and ²1 → 0 as N gets large (follows from the fact that conditioning
does not increase entropy and the security of the information carried in V¯m), and
1
N
H(V¯ (i)r |Y¯ (i)e , V¯ (i)m ) ≤ ²2, (31)
where ²2 → 0 as N →∞ (follows from Fano’s inequality).
We now consider the total information accumulation and leakage. Let W ∗ = W¯ (1···L) , {V¯ (l;m)m , V¯ (l;m)r ,∀l ∈
[1, L],∀m ∈ [1,M ]} and denote the estimate of it at Bob as Wˆ ∗. We obtain that, there exist N1,M1, s.t. for any
N ≥ N1 and M ≥M1
H(W ∗) ≥ LMN (E [C(Wm)]− ²∗) , (32)
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and
Pr{W ∗ 6= Wˆ ∗} ≤ LM2−Nβ , (33)
for some β ∈ (0, 12 ) due to the polar coding result and the union bound.
Considering all the observations accumulated at the Eve as Y ∗e , Y¯
(1···L)
e , we write
H(W ∗|Y ∗e ) =
L∑
l=1
H(W¯ (l)|Y¯ (l)e ) =
LM∑
i=1
H(V¯ (i)m |Y¯ (i)e ) +H(V¯ (i)r |Y¯ (i)e , V¯ (i)m ) (34)
Focusing on a particular super block, omitting the index (l) in (W¯ (l), Y¯ (l)e ), and using (30) and (31) in (34), we
obtain
MN
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]+
]− ²4) ≤ H(W¯ |Y¯e) (35)
≤ MN (E [[C(Wm)− C(We)]+]+ ²5) , (36)
where ²4 and ²5 vanishes as M,N get large.
In order to translate H(W ∗|Y ∗e ) to Re´nyi entropy to use Lemma 10 in our problem, we resort to typical sequences,
as for a uniform random variable both measures are the same. Considering (W¯ (1), · · · , W¯ (L), Y¯ (1)e , · · · , Y¯ (L)e ) as L
repetitions of the experiment of super block random variables (W¯, Y¯e), we define the event T based on typical sets
as follows [15]: Let δ > 0. T = 1, if the sequences w¯(1···L) and (w¯(1···L), y¯(1···L)e ) are δ-typical; and y¯
(1···L)
e is such
that the probability that (w¯′(1···L), y¯(1···L)e ) is δ-typical is at least 1− δ, which is taken over w¯′(1···L) according to
p(W¯ ′
(1···L)|y¯(1···L)e ). Otherwise, we set T = 0 and denote δ0 , Pr{T = 0}. Then, by Lemma 6 of [15], as L→∞
Lδ0 → 0 and Lδ → 0, (37)
and
R(W¯ (1···L)|Y¯ (1···L)e = y¯(1···L)e , T = 1) ≥ L(H(W¯ |Y¯e)− 2δ) + log(1− δ). (38)
We continue as follows.
R(W¯ (1···L)|Y¯ (1···L)e = y¯(1···L)e , T = 1) ≥ L(H(W¯ |Y¯e)− 2δ) + log(1− δ)
≥ LMN
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]+
]− ²4 − 2δ
MN
+
log(1− δ)
LMN
)
= LMN
(
E
[
[C(Wm)− C(We)]+
]− δ∗) , (39)
where δ∗ → 0 as M,N →∞.
Thus, for the given ²∗ > 0, there exists M2, N2 s.t. for M ≥ M2 and N ≥ N2, ²∗2 ≥ δ∗. We let r =
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LMN (E [[C(Wm)− C(We)]+]− ²∗) and continue as follows.
H(K|Y ∗e , G) ≥ H(K|Y ∗e , G, T )
= Pr{T = 1}H(K|Y ∗e , G, T = 1) + Pr{T = 0}H(K|Y ∗e , G, T = 0)
(a)
≥ (1− δ0)
∑
y∗e∈Y∗e
H(K|Y ∗e = y∗e , G, T = 1)P (Y ∗e = y∗e |T = 1)
(b)
≥ (1− δ0)
r − ∑
y∗e∈Y∗e
2r−R(W
∗|Y ∗e =y∗e ,T=1)
ln 2
P (Y ∗e = y
∗
e |T = 1)

(c)
≥ (1− δ0)
(
r − 2
−LMN(²∗−δ∗)
ln 2
)
(40)
where in (a) δ0 is s.t. Lδ0 → 0 as L→∞, (b) is due to Lemma 10 given above, (c) is due to (39) and the choice
of r. Here, for the given ² > 0, there exists M3, N3 s.t. for M ≥ M3 and N ≥ N3, 2
−LMN( ²∗2 )
ln 2 ≤ ²2 . Hence, we
obtain
I(K;Y ∗e , G) = H(K)−H(K|Y ∗e , G) (41)
≤ δ0r + 2
−LMN(²∗−δ∗)
ln 2
(42)
≤ δ0LMN + 2
−LMN(²∗−δ∗)
ln 2
(43)
(a)
≤ δ0LMN + 2
−LMN( ²∗2 )
ln 2
(44)
(b)
≤ δ0LMN + ²2 , (45)
where (a) holds if M ≥M2 and N ≥ N2 and (b) holds if M ≥M3 and N ≥ N3.
Now, we choose some M ≥ max{M1,M2,M3}. For this choice of M , we choose sufficiently large L and
sufficiently large N such that N ≥ max{N1, N2, N3} and
δ0LMN ≤ ²2 (46)
LM2−N
β ≤ ², (47)
which holds as δ0L→ 0 as L→∞ in (37). (In fact, due to [15, Lemma 4 and Lemma 6], for any ²′ > 0, we can
take δ0L ≤ ²′L as L gets large.) Therefore, for this choice of L,M,N , we obtain the desired result from (32), (33),
(45), due to (46) and (47):
H(W ∗) ≥ LMN (E [C(Wm)]− ²∗) (48)
Pr{W ∗ 6= Wˆ ∗} ≤ ² (49)
I(K;Y ∗e , G) ≤ ² (50)
In addition, for this choice of L,M,N , we bound H(K) ≥ r − ² due to (40), which shows that the key is
approximately uniform.
Few remarks are now in order.
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1) The results do not depend on random coding arguments. Coding is low complex: a) Any code in the
ensemble will work (frozen bits can be set to all zero vector), b) Overall encoding and decoding complexity
is O(LMN log(N)) for a total number of LMN channel uses, c) Code construction has O(N) complexity for
each block, as the main channel is erasure channel [8].
2) Existing code designs in the literature and also the previous sections of this work assume that Eve’s channel is
known at Alice and Bob. In the above scheme, Alice and Bob only need the statistical knowledge of eavesdropper
CSI. Also, the main channel is not necessarily stronger than the eavesdropper channel, which is not the case for
degraded wiretap settings.
3) In the above scheme, instead of hash function and Re´nyi entropy, extractor functions and min-entropy can be
used [15]. Similar to above, we can obtain
H∞(W ∗|Y ∗e = y∗e , T = 1) ≥ LMN(E[[C(Wm)− C(We)]+]− δ∗),
as min-entropy and entropy are same if the random variable is uniformly distributed. Now by Lemma 9 of [15],
for any ∆ > 0 and sufficiently large L, there exist an extractor g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}r with d ≤ ∆n s.t.,
if V is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}d then
H(K = E(W ∗, V )|Y ∗e = y∗e , g, V, T = 1) ≥ r − 2−n
1/2−o(1)
.
Note that extractors can be efficient compared to universal hashing. For example, while the randomly chosen hash
function may require n bits to describe, the extractor can be described with d ≤ ∆n bits with small ∆. If the chosen
(hash or extractor) function has to be communicated through the same channel, this property can be exploited to
increase the key renewal rate.
4) If the inverse of the hash (or extractor) functions can be computed easily, then this scheme can be used for
secure message transmission. The enabling idea is to randomly select the transmitted input (here, information bits
of the polar code) among the set g−1(K), where K here denotes the message that we would like to transmit. Then,
Bob can recover the message that is secured from the Eve with the above scheme.
5) The result can be extended to the multi-eavesdropper scenario. If the eavesdroppers do not collude, we can
use the worst average leakage, i.e., r = min
We
LMN(E[[C(Wm) − C(We)]+] − ²∗), for the key. If they collude,
assuming that there exist a physical degradation order among them, we can use the best eavesdropper channel for
each fading block in the expression, i.e., r = LMN(E[[C(Wm)− C(W ∗e )]+]− ²∗) where the expectation is over
the statistics of the best eavesdropper denoted by W ∗e .
6) The above scheme can be used for the wiretap channel of Section IV by setting M = 0 to achieve strong
secrecy (assuring arbitrarily small information leakage) instead of the weak notion (making the leakage rate small).
See also [15].
7) The results can be extended to arbitrary binary-input channels along the same lines, using the result of
Section IV. In such a setting, the above theorem would be reformulated with n = LMN(E[I(Wm)] − ²∗) and
r = LMN(E[[I(Wm) − I(We)]+] − ²∗). However, the code construction complexity of such channels may not
scale as good as that of the erasure channels [8].
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VII. DISCUSSION
In this work, we consider polar coding for binary-input point-to-point and multiple-access channels with a
degraded eavesdropper. It is shown that polar coding can be utilized to achieve non-trivial secrecy rates for both
channels. The results might be extended to arbitrary discrete memoryless channels using the techniques given in [16]
(see Appendix A). In addition, results for the multiple-access channels might be enhanced using the rate-splitting
technique proposed in [17]. We note that, polar coding for multiple-access channels is recently considered in [18],
where the authors show that MAC can be polarized into five different extremal channels. This observation is used
to achieve rate pairs on the dominant face of the rate region obtained by uniform inputs in [18]. This technique
can be utilized in the secrecy setting by taking advantage of the extremal channels of the main channel over the
eavesdropper channel. The second focus of this work is the secret key agreement over wireless channels, where
we showed that Alice and Bob can create advantage over Eve by using the polar coding scheme at each fading
block, which is then exploited with privacy amplification techniques to generate keys. This result is interesting in
the sense that part of the key agreement protocol is established information theoretically over fading channels by
only requiring statistical knowledge of eavesdropper CSI at the users.
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APPENDIX A
OTHER POLAR CODE RESULTS
A. Polarization for an arbitrary DMC
Recently, the channel polarization result of [8] has extended to arbitrary discrete memoryless channels in [16].
These extended result shows polar codes achieving the symmetric capacity of the q-ary DMC W given by
I(W ) ,
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
1
q
W (y|x) logq
 W (y|x)∑
x′∈X
1
qW (y|x′)
 , (51)
where |X | = q.
B. Polar codes with non-uniform input distributions
The following method, given in [19], is used in [11] and [16] to construct polar codes with non-uniform input
distributions. Let X and X ′ be two finite sets with |X ′| = m. Then, any distribution p(x) for x ∈ X for which
mp(x) is an integer ∀x can be implemented by a uniform distribution on X ′ and a deterministic map f : X ′ → X .
Using this map, we define the augmented channel W ′(y|x′) = W (y|f(x′)). Then, the symmetric capacity of W ′,
I(W ′), is equal to I(X;Y ) with input distribution p(x). This technique can be used to approach the true capacity
of any DMC by approximating the capacity achieving input distribution by a rational p(x) and using the above
channel augmentation technique ( [16]).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
We define W1m, W1e, W2m, and W2e as given in the theorem.
For a given sufficiently large N and β ∈ (0, 12 ), let
A1m = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(W1m(i)N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β},
and
A1e = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N} : Z(W1e(i)N ) ≤
1
N
2−N
β}.
Now, consider a polar code C1m , C(N,F1m, u1F1m) for the channel W1m with some u1F1m , where F1m = Ac1m.
Due to Lemma 4, we have A1e ⊂ A1m and hence F1m ⊂ F1e. Now, for any given length |F1e| − |F1m| vector
v¯1m and u1F1m , we define the vector u1F1e(v¯1m) with u1F1m(v¯1m) = u1F1m and u1F1e\F1m(v¯1m) = v¯1m. Then,
the code C1e(v¯1m) , C(N,F1e, u1F1e(v¯1m)) will be a symmetric capacity achieving polar code for the channel
W1e averaged over the ensemble.
We similarly define A2m, A2e, C2m, and C2e for channels W2m and W2e by replacing the subscript 1 with 2
everywhere above.
Encoding: A code is chosen uniformly from the ensemble by choosing u1F1m i.i.d. according to uniform
distribution. User 1 maps the secrecy message to be transmitted to v¯1m and generate a random vector v¯1r, according
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to uniform distribution over X1, of length |A1e|. Then, the channel input is constructed with x1N1 = u1N1 BNF⊗n,
where u1F1m is the frozen vector of the polar code C1m, u1F1e\F1m = v¯1m, and u1A1e = v¯1r.
User 2 maps the secrecy message to be transmitted to v¯2m and generate a random vector v¯2r, according to
uniform distribution over X2, of length |A2e|. Then, the channel input is constructed with x2N1 = u2N1 BNF⊗n,
where the vector u2N1 is designed for channels W2m and W2e along the similar lines given above.
Decoding: The main receiver, having u1F1m , decodes both V¯1m and V¯1r over the channel W1m (considering
the other user’s input, x2, as noise) with the SC decoder for polar codes with error probability Pe = O(2−N
β
)
(averaged over the ensemble) achieving a rate R1 =
|v¯1m|
N = I(W1m)− I(W1e) for sufficiently large N .
After having x1N1 , it can decode both V¯2m and V¯2r over the channel W2m (given the knowledge of u2F2m) with
the SC decoder for polar codes with error probability Pe = O(2−N
β
) (averaged over the ensemble) achieving a
rate R2 =
|v¯2m|
N = I(W2m)− I(W2e) for sufficiently large N .
Security: Employing the SC decoding, the eavesdropper can decode the random vector V¯1r over the channel
W1e with error probability Pe = O(2−N
β
) (averaged over V¯1m and U1F1e). Utilizing the Fano’s inequality, similar
to the proof of Theorem 5, we therefore have
H(V¯1r|V¯1m, U1F1m , YeN1 ) ≤ N²1(N), (52)
where ²1(N)→ 0 as N →∞.
In addition, given the knowledge of x1N1 (say by an oracle), the eavesdropper can decode V¯2r over the channel
W2e with error probability Pe = O(2−N
β
) (averaged over V¯2m and U2F2e ). Utilizing the Fano’s inequality, we
therefore have
H(V¯2r|V¯2m, U2F2m , x1N1 , YeN1 ) ≤ N²2(N), (53)
where ²2(N)→ 0 as N →∞.
Combining the two above, we have
H(V¯1r, V¯2r|V¯1m, V¯2m, U1F1m , U2F2m , YeN1 )
(a)
≤ H(V¯1r|V¯1m, U1F1m , YeN1 )
+H(V¯2r|V¯1m, V¯2m, U1F1m , U2F2m , V¯1r, YeN1 )
(b)
= H(V¯1r|V¯1m, U1F1m , YeN1 )
+
∑
x1N1 ∈X×N1
H(V¯2r|V¯2m, U2F2m , X1N1 = x1N1 , YeN1 )
(c)
≤ N²(N), (54)
where (a) is due to the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy and (b) is due to the fact that X1N1 is
determined by V¯1m, V¯1r, and U1F1m ; and {V¯1m, V¯1r, U1F1m} → X1N1 → YeN1 form a Markov chain; (c) follows
from (52) and (53) with some ²(N)→ 0 as N →∞.
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Then, the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper averaged over the ensemble of codes can be bounded
as follows.
I(M1,M2;YeN1 |U1F1m , U2F2m) = I(V¯1m, V¯2m;YeN1 |U1F1m , U2F2m)
= I(V¯1m, V¯2m, V¯1r, V¯2r;YeN1 |U1F1m , U2F2m)
−I(V¯1r, V¯2r;YeN1 |V¯1m, V¯2m, U1F1m , U2F2m) (55)
≤ I(X1N1 , X2N1 ;YeN1 )−H(V¯1r, V¯2r)
+H(V¯1r, V¯2r|V¯1m, V¯2m, U1F1m , U2F2m , YeN1 )
(a)
≤ N {I(W1e) + I(W2e)} − |A1e| − |A2e|+N²(N),
where in (a) we have I(X1N1 , X2
N
1 ;Ye
N
1 ) =
N∑
i=1
I(X1N1 , X2
N
1 ;Yei|Yei−11 ) ≤ NI(X1, X2;Ye) due to the fact that
conditioning does not increase entropy; with uniformly distributed channel inputs. As
lim
N→∞
|A1e|+ |A2e|
N
= I(W1e) + I(W2e), (56)
due to the code construction, and ²(N)→ 0 as N →∞ from (54), we obtain that
1
N
I(M1,M2;YeN1 |U1F1m , U2F2m) ≤ ² (57)
for any given ² > 0 for sufficiently large N .
Therefore, after an expurgation argument, we can find a code at each user satisfying the reliability and secrecy
constraints and achieving the reported rates given in the theorem.
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